The beauty of poker is that 10 players could play the same hand 10 different ways. Granted, most of us would raise with aces preflop, but the amounts might be different. Or maybe the way we'd play them against different opponents would change our strategy.

It's time for a debate focusing on a play that most poker fans might already know about. With three players left at the final table of the 2006 World Series of Poker main event, Paul Wasicka was faced with a very tough decision. With a straight-flush draw, Wasicka's decision would dramatically affect the way the rest of the tournament played out. Paul and I spoke about this hand recently, and his rationale is spot on. As you read the debate below, think about everything that you learn over the course of a tournament and how you would use that information when it's crunch time.

At the end of this column, don't forget to watch the motion clip of how this hand unfolded on ESPN's coverage of the WSOP.

Don't forget to read below this week's debate for some of your feedback from last week's column. Submit your response and you could be featured next week. If you've missed any previous debate, just click on any Monday in the calendar to the left and weigh in with your opinions.

Let the debate begin ...

Situation: There are three players left at the final table. Jamie Gold has a commanding chip lead with $64 million, followed by Paul Wasicka with $14 million and Michael Binger with $11 million. The blinds are $200,000/$400,000 with a $100,000 ante.

Gold limped from the button and Wasicka called as well with 7s-8s. Binger decided to test the waters with a $1.5 million raise and both players called.

The flop was 10c-6s-5s.

Wasicka checked. Binger bet out $3.5 million, and Gold decided to move all-in over the top. Wasicka is now faced with the toughest poker decision of his life. Just for reference, third place paid $4,123,310, second place paid $6,102,499, and first place paid a cool $12 million.

Wasicka's words at the time: "This is sick. This is disgusting."

Feldman: In Michael Binger's words, "I don't see how he can fold there, unless he was playing to lock up second." Although the decision was in no way that black and white, I'm leaning toward a call in this situation. With 15 cards that Wasicka could hit to make a huge step in leveling the playing field. If he hits one of his cards, he just about triples up, but then again if he misses, he's out of the tournament. Additionally, if he misses, and Gold doesn't have the best hand in this situation, chances are Binger triples up and Wasicka is eliminated in third place, not second.

All that said, you're on the biggest poker stage in the world. Against a player like Jamie Gold, don't you need as many chips as possible when going to heads-up play? I was standing next to the final table after I heard what you let go, and all I can ask is, how can you lay that hand down?

Wasicka: To me, I felt like if I were to call the all-in there I was going to be up against a higher draw heads up against Jamie and that Binger would fold. The other alternative is that I called and Binger calls, which means he would've had a made hand like a set, or a better draw than mine. Those are the only two hands that I could see him calling with and I'd be in horrible shape in those situations.

Feldman: But wouldn't you think that Binger was committed to the hand? He'd already put in 60 percent of his stack leaving him with just $5.5 million behind. How did you factor in Binger's situation at that time?

Wasicka: In a tournament, you're not going to always do the exact math play and Binger has got to know that I've got a bigger hand if I call Jamie's all-in. At that point, he's got to look at two huge hands that he's got to suck out on. He's got to hope that I get eliminated. He's down to $5.5 million, which is pretty bleak, but isn't guaranteed out. There is a ton of money in the pot, but he could be close to drawing dead.

Feldman: Good point, but isn't it worth his chances to triple up here? Either way, I'm sure that the money played an important factor in your decision. How did the money affect your thought process?

Wasicka: I thought I would have a better chance at getting first place if I folded here. This was the way to go for first. I still had 11 million in chips, which I didn't think was insurmountable to come back from. If I fold, I have 11 million and it doesn't really matter who wins the pot. If Binger wins I'm up against two people. If Jamie wins I'm up against one person. Either way, I'd have the same amount. Obviously I'd prefer Binger to get knocked out at that point, but I knew that making the fold I'd have to come back from so many chips either way, and I thought I could do it. I felt very comfortable with my heads-up game as I play in many shorthanded situations.

It's also important to note that had Michael checked and Jamie went all-in, I would've called. It wasn't simply a matter of trying to fold my way into second place, as many people assume. I thought folding would give me the best shot at winning. People are quick to forget my willingness to go for first in the hand against Allen. My decision to fold was about using pieces of information throughout the hand to develop a read on a player and having the discipline to follow that read. Also, had Michael gone all-in and Jamie went all-in behind him, I would have called. In this scenario, the only way I come in third place is if Michael wins the main pot and Jamie beats me in the side pot. Though, even if I survived the side pot, I'd be severely crippled and very likely to take third anyway.

Feldman: Tripling up would've been just what you needed, so why pass up on this opportunity? You would've evened out the playing field and could've been in a much better position against Gold.

Wasicka: Had I won the hand I would've had 45 million and Jamie would've had slightly more. It would be about even and I would've been more confident to win it from there, but nothing is guaranteed. Anything could happen. Just because you're even in chips doesn't guarantee a title. It still would be a lot of work for the title. I thought that I should wait for a better spot where I didn't feel that I'd be in a dominated position.

Feldman: Did you have a read on the other two that persuaded your decision one way or the other?

Wasicka: Actually, the decision was solely based on a read that I had against both players and if you go against your read you won't do well in tournaments. I'd been using it the entire WSOP and I didn't want to go against it at that time.

So what happened? Wasicka folded. Binger turned up A-10 for top pair and Gold flipped over 4s-3c for an open-ended straight draw. The turn was a seven and Gold eliminated Binger and took a monstrous advantage into heads-up play against Wasicka. The river, by the way, was the Qs, which would have given Wasicka his flush.

There's a lot more to the thought process than just what Paul has written above. If you're interested, check out www.kwickfish.com for some additional insight on the hand.

What would you do if you were in this situation? Send us your feedback and we'll take a look at your thoughts next time.

Feedback from the last debate:

Rob (Middletown) Given the size of the pot, I think moving all-in was a mistake if the ultimate goal is to get your opponents to put up at least some of their chips. The cutoff player isn't going to bet unless he/she is going to win. The big blind more than likely would have called a smaller bet in hopes of a chopped pot. With the pot at $600, a bet of $300 or $400 would more likely get a call from your opponent.

Aris (emory) Even under modest assumptions you have bet small here. The numbers are clear. Assume you get two callers 40 percent of the time, one caller 50 percent and folds the remaining 10 percent of the time if you bet 300. Further assume that if you bet $2,700, then you will only be called 25 percent of the time by one person and folds the rest of the time. And that is a very high number. In the first situation you get .4*1200+.5*900+0=$930. Compare this to .25 *3300=$825. So even under these conditions where you think your opponent will call you 25 percent of the time you still shouldn't do it if you think you will get a call from one of you opponents under reasonable conditions. The pot has to be much bigger for an all in to work.

Neal (Houston) You bet about 1/2 the amount of another guys chips (if they both have decent stacks). If one has 1500 left and another has 1200 or something. Just push in like 600-700 chips, you may get someone to come over the top of you thinking hey maybe I can push this guy out and worst case we chop it. I think pot size doesn't matter that much here considering it was said that these players aren't very good.

Jeremy (Madison, AL) I wouldn't have played it any different. It's unfortunate that two deuces came out, but that's the way it goes. Had any other card come out, you probably would have been paid off. You can't bet after the flop of A-A-A because no one in their right mind is going to call you unless someone is holding a pocket pair. But there was no raising pre-flop so chances are there are no pocket pairs except for maybe someone limping with pocket threes or fours. Good play, unfortunate outcome.

Rob (Chicago) I would have bet the flop. People never bet the flop when the hit huge and everybody knows it so it works so well. The old players always say check a monster unless it is the absolute nuts. There was $600 in there on the flop; a bet of about $600 would look like a steal and be likely to be called. If it was, you could check the turn and see if they go for the steal. By checking all the way you are hoping someone hits a 6 outer and also feels that he can get something out of the hand. Better off to bet early.

Shravan (San Francisco) I think you played this hand about as poorly as you possibly could have. Given that your read on them is that they're fish, I would have thrown out a small bet on the flop. If they have any respect for your preflop play, they probably won't figure you for a pocket pair (or, for that matter, the case ace). If one or both of them call your flop bet, you can easily feign weakness by checking the turn. This sets them up for a great steal opportunity, because you've shown weakness and there are more chips in the pot. If they happen to check behind, a pot-sized bet (or slightly lower) on the river would be a *great* play, because it is set up by your weak turn check. Now that the board is a full house, it would be really easy to think that you're just trying to muscle them out of a chopped pot. The basic reason that I think you played this poorly is: you played this exactly the way someone who flopped quads would play it! Checked it twice and then threw out an obvious overbet. If you want to give the appearance of a vulnerable hand, bet the flop. If they're as fishy as you think they are, they'll call you with any high(ish) cards, thinking that if they hit, they'll have the hand won. Also, by pushing all-in, you've taken away their opportunity to try a steal reraise.